Procedural Posture

Plaintiffs roofing workers brought a class action against defendant employer, alleging violations of federal and state wage-and-hour laws. Before the court were joint motions for final approval of the class action settlement, class certification, and judgment, and for approval of fees, representative awards, and costs. Parties’ civil litigation attorney appeal.

Table of Contents

Overview

The terms of preliminary approval had been satisfied where the procedures for notice to the class members had been carried out. Final approval of a settlement class was appropriate where the 177 class number met the numerosity requirement, common questions of both fact and law existed regarding the employer’s alleged failure to abide by federal and state wage laws, the named workers’ claims were essentially identical to those of the whole class, and the named workers had the same interests and were represented by experienced and competent counsel. The class also met the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) where the monetary damages each worker individually suffered were relatively modest, and the instant action was the only known case. Final approval of the settlement was appropriate where the strength of the workers’ case, the risk and likely duration of further litigation, the settlement amount, the stage of the proceedings and extent of completed discovery, the experience and views of counsel, and the reaction of class members weighed in favor of approval. Moreover, the payments to the class representatives and class counsel were fair and reasonable.

Outcome

The joint motions to certify the settlement class, approve the settlement, approve the proposed class representative payments, approve the proposed class counsel attorney fee award, and approve class counsel’s costs award were granted.

Defendants, a car dealer and a finance company, sought review of an order from the Superior Court of Solano County (California), which denied their petition to compel arbitration of plaintiff consumer’s action alleging statutory violations relating to the financing of a used car.

Overview

The retail installment sales contract contained an arbitration clause, which was located on the reverse side of the preprinted contract and had a large bold header in capital letters. A statement above the final signature line, also in capital letters, noted the presence of an arbitration clause on the reverse side. The consumer asserted that he had not read the arbitration clause and was unaware of its existence when he bought the car. The court held that the consumer could not avoid the arbitration clause under Code Civ. Proc., § 1281, based on unconscionability under Civ. Code, § 1670.5, because the degree of procedural unconscionability arising from the use of the preprinted contract was minimal. The arbitration clause was conspicuous, and lengthy two-sided contract forms were commonly used by dealers to comply with Civ. Code, § 2981.9, and other statutes. Moreover, the only suggestion of substantive unconscionability was a one-sided term pertaining to a second arbitration. Requiring the consumer to pay his own costs did not violate Code Civ. Proc., § 1284.3, subd. (a), and was not unconscionable absent evidence that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive.